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CORPORATE TAKE-OVER
BIDS: GAP IN FEDERAL SECURITIES
REGULATION t
HUGE L. SOWAiDS*
JAMES S. MOFSKY**
INTRODUCTION
T HE Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,1 described as
"the most significant statutory advance in Federal
Securities regulation since 1940,11 extended to investors in
the larger unlisted companies the same protection formerly
afforded only to investors whose securities were listed on
an exchange. Furthermore, these amendments strengthened
the standards of entrance into the securities business and
expanded disciplinary controls over brokers, dealers and
other security industry personnel.3 The enactment of this
legislation constituted a major step forward in investor
protection: elimination of the disparity between the dis-
closure requirements of the exchanges and the over-the-
t This article is based on an address delivered at the Securities Laws
and Regulations Institute held on January 20-21, 1967 in Miami, Florida.
*B.S. 1941, Trinity College; LL.B. 1946, Yale University; Professor of
Law, University of Miami.
**A.B. 1956, Wesleyan University; LL.B. 1959, Cornell University;
LL.M. 1966, University of MiamL
178 Stat. 565 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 313 (1964).
2 SEC, 31st ANUAL REPORT 1 (1965); SEC News Digest No. 64-9-9
(Sept. 14, 1964).
3 See S. Rep. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1964); H.R. Rep.
No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1964).
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counter markets. But an important area of securities regu-
lation-protection of investors in connection with corporate
take-over bids-remains untouched and neglected. It is an
area in which a double standard of disclosure still exists
and one in which public investors are asked to sell in
darkness. The main objectives of this article are to examine
the current situation with respect to corporate take-over
bids, to bring into sharp focus what the writers believe to
be a serious gap in securities regulation, and to underscore
the immediate need for adequate legislation: legislation
which would protect the investing public without excessively
obstructing potential bids for control.
NATURE OF THE TAKE-OvER BID AND REASONS
FOR ITS ASCENDANCY
In recent years there has been a marked increase in
the use of cash tender offers - take-over bids - by persons
whose objective is to acquire control of public companies.4
Of course, the tender offer is a device that has been used
for a variety of other corporate purposes,5 but this article
is confined to a discussion of its use as related to take-over
bids. Reasons for the popularity enjoyed by the take-over
4 See Merjos, No Tender Trap, Barron's Nat'l Bus. & Financial Weekly,
Jan. 25, 1965, p. 5; Buying Into a Company Via the Tender Offer, Bus.
Week, Feb. 26, 1966, p. 38; Cash Is Eclipsing Proxy Wars, N. Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1966, p. 110, col. 3; Cohen, Address to the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries, Inc., June 28, 1966; Comment, The Regulation of
Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities Law: A New Challengefor Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 359 (1966). Of course, the cash tender
offer may be used for purposes other than acquisition of control. Infra
note 5.
5 Perhaps the most common use of the tender offer occurs when a
corporation seeks to acquire its own securities. See More Companies Are
Buying Back Their Stock, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April 1965, pp. 40. 53;
Investing In Yourself, Wall Street Journal, June 30, 1965, p. 1, col. 6;
The Case for Retiring Stock, Fortune, Nov. 1965, p. 245; Fleck, Corporate
Share Repurchasing: An Informal Discussion, HAav. Bus. S. BuLL., Jan.-
Feb. 1965, p. 10; Zilber, Corporate Tender Offers for Their Own Stock:
Some Legal and Financial Considerations, 33 U. CINc. L. REv. 315 (1964).
Other uses of the tender offer include: purchase of outstanding shares of
minority shareholders; reduction of capitalization; increasing treasury stock
for future acquisitions or for options; thinning out of stockholder lists;
elimination of a class of stock; obtaining of shares to meet sinking fund
requirements; to settle a shareholder's derivative action. See Merjos, supra
note 4.
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bid are fourfold: secrecy, speed, simplicity and savings. As
SEC Chairman Cohen has observed: "It is certainly sim-
pler, and perhaps less costly, than a proxy fight for control.
• * , In many cases of cash tender offers . . . the public
investor does not even know the identity of the purchaser,
much less what the purchaser plans to do with the company
if the take-over bid is successful."6  In short, if a cash
tender offer is used, the bidding company or group may
simply insert an advertisement in a newspaper asking share-
holders to tender their shares at a certain price. No filing
with any regulatory agency is necessary. Moreover, such
material facts as the present security holdings, market
activity, and even the name and background of the person
making the take-over bid, need not be disclosed. This is in
sharp contrast with the situation involving an exchange
offer. When Corporation A makes an offer to the individual
shareholders of Corporation B to exchange A shares for
their B shares, unless some exemption is available, the
exchange offer is subject .to the registration requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933.! Registration, of course,
means full and fair disclosure. Broadly speaking, this
disclosure objective is accomplished by requiring the offering
corporation to file a registration statement with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission containing financial and
other pertinent material. This requirement is the heart of
the "truth in securities" law. The registration statement
must be filed prior to the offering. Furthermore, a pro-
spectus, containing that portion of the information in the
registration statement considered necessary to enable an
investor to evaluate the securities and to make an informed
judgment whether or not to make the exchange, must be
made available to all offerees. From the standpoint of pro-
tection of investors, the cash tender offer, as a device for
acquiring control, is also sharply distinguishable from a
proxy contest. Proxy contests are subject to the advance
I Cohen, 4upra note 4.
7 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 68 Stat. 683 (1954), 15 U.S.C. §77b
(1964). On the possible availability of exemptions, see SowAams, T a
FErDAL Swcuairms AcT §§2.03(1), 4.02 (1965).
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filing, examination and full and fair disclosure provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 8 Finally, exchange
offers and proxy contests are subject to -the civil and crim-
inal liability provisions of the 1933 and 1931 Acts respec-
tively. No such express sanctions exist with respect to
cash tender offers.
The mechanics of the take-over bid are simple. Typ-
icaly, X, the person seeking to acquire control, or X's
agent, will make an offer by newspaper advertisement to
purchase for cash a certain number of shares of Y Corpora-
tion at a fixed price that is set above the current market
price. Y Corporation shareholders are invited to tender
their shares for purchase by X or X's agent. More specif-
ically, Y Corporation shareholders who wish to accept the
offer are instructed (1) to send a "letter of transmittal,"
accompanied by their stock certificates in transferable form,
to X or X's agent, or (2) to request their bank or broker
to effect the tender transaction for them. A date and hour
for termination of the purchase offer are stated.
The "letter of transmittal," and "letter of offer" ob-
tainable from X or X's agent, may make the offer a con-
ditional one. A common condition makes the purchase offer
operative only in the event that a minimum number of
shares are tendered prior to the expiration date.' Until
that time the shareholder who has tendered his shares may
not trade them." Collateral problems may be raised in this
8 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), as amended, 78 Stat. 569
(1964), 15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1964). For a discussion of current proxy
regulation, see Sowards and Mofsky, Federal Proxy Regulation: Recent
Extension of Controls, 41 ST. JOHN's L. RFv. 165 (1966).
9 Thus, in a recent tender offer for 350,000 shares of Columbia Pictures
Corp., the offer was conditioned as follows: "All shares up to 350,000
shares tendered before the offer expires will be purchased provided at least
200,000 shares are tendered. If less than 200,000 shares are tendered, none
or all or a portion of the excess shares may be purchased. Tenders of all
or a portion of such excess shares may be assigned to others. If less than
all shares tendered up to October 14, 1966 are purchased, they will be pur-
chased on a pro rata basis." Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 1966, p. 32, col 2.
10 In an advertisement replying to the Columbia Pictures offer, supra
note 9, management advised shareholders as follows: "Remember, a tender
by you is irrevocable. Once you tender your stock, you cannot withdraw it
or sell it or borrow on it. You will be giving the Swiss bank a free option
to buy your stock for $33.00 a share until at least October 14, 1966, and
possibly beyond that date." Wall Street Journal, Oct. 7, 1966, p. 24, col. 5.
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area. Are all shareholders given an equal opportunity to
accept the offer? If the offer is to purchase a specified
number of shares, must tenders be accepted on a pro rata
basis in the event that shareholders tender more than that
number? With respect to companies whose securities are
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, "the offer should
provide that tenders will be accepted on a pro rata basis
if more shares are tendered than are to be purchased...
After a minimum period of 10 days for the acceptance of
shares on a pro rata basis, there is no objection to receiving
shares thereafter on a 'first-come first-served' basis."'1  This
policy stems from the practical premise that all shareholders
should be given an equal opportunity to participate in
tender offers."2  But if the offer specifies no reasonable
minimum period of acceptance, shareholders residing at a
distance may be deprived of an ample opportunity to learn
of the tender offer and to tender their shares.3 Similar con-
siderations apply to companies whose securities are listed
on the American Stock Exchange, but the other eleven
organized American stock exchanges and the National Asso-
11 N.Y. STOCx EXCHANGE MANUAL A-180 (1963).
12 N.Y. STOcK EXCHANGE MANUAL A-179 (1963).
'3 If the minimum 10-day period is used, "notices should be sent by air
mail to distant stockholders and provision made for telegraphic acceptance
through a member firm or bank, similar to a rights offering." N.Y. STocx
EXCHANGE MANUAL A-180 (1963). The same policy has been followed with
respect to limiting a tender offer to shareholders of record on a certain
date, for the reason that shareholders who had collateralized their shares or
into whose names the shares had not been transferred would not be holders
on the record date and thus might be deprived of their right to participate
in the tender offer. Ibid. On tender offer commission charges involving
use of the facilities of an exchange member organization, see N.Y. STOCK
EXCHANGE M.F. EDUC. CmCULAR No. 161, June 15, 1962.
24 Although the American Stock Exchange has no formal rule governing
the making of tender offers, the Exchange "recommends that, where a
tender offer is limited to a certain number of shares, invitations to tender
be given to all stockholders on a pro rata basis and not on a first-come
first-served basis. Furthermore, this Exchange objects to an offer being
made to holders of a security listed on this Exchange when it is limited to
holders of record only. Rather, the offer should be made to all beneficial
holders of the security, whether or not they are record holders." Letter
from A. R. Steffens (American Stock Exchange) to the writers, Oct. 4,
1966.
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ciation of Securities Dealers, Inc. have no rules regulating
the form of tender offers. 5
THEi INADEQUACY OF CURRENT REGULATION OF
(CORPORATE TAKE-OVEi BIDS
Existing legislation inadequately deals with corporate
take-over bids via the cash tender offer. First of all, there
is no federal statute, rule or regulation expressly regulating
cash tender offers."8 Second, the applicability by implica-
tion of existing statutes, rules or regulations to cash tender
offers is doubtful. Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193417 and the controversial rule 10b-5's are
15 The limited amount of state regulation of the form of tender offers
has been restricted to purchase by a corporation of its own shares. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(c) (1) (providing for purchase "pro rata from
all its shareholders or all of a class of shareholders").
16 See notes 11-15 supra for regulations governing the form of tender
offers.
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 does make it unlawful to
"offer to buy . . . unless a registration has been filed as to such security... "
48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964). However, it is clear that
the term "offer to buy" was included originally in section 5 expressly for
the purpose of preventing professional securities dealers from offering to
buy from underwriters prior to the effective date. The 1954 amendments
merely effected a change in this dealer-underwriter prohibition so as to
preclude such offers prior to the filing date. See S. Rep. No. 1036, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 85, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1954); SOWARDS, THE FEDERAL SEcunRI=S Acr § 7.04(2) (1965).
17 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 48 Stat.
891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §781(b) (1964).
Is "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1964).
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foremost candidates. It has been suggested, however, that
section 10 and rule 10b-5 may not be applicable to many
cash tender offers. Reason: the section and the rule are
not activated unless there is a duty to disclose. Further,
no duty to disclose arises unless there exists a fiduciary or
special relationship between the parties to the transaction
of purchase and sale. 9 One may quarrel with this conclu-
sion on the ground that both the section and the rule apply
to "any person," but what few judicial and administrative
pronouncements there are apparently reject such a literal
application. 0  In the celebrated Cady, Roberts case, for
example, Professor Cary, then SEC Chairman, while noting
that "the anti-fraud provisions are phrased in terms of 'any
person,' added that "a special obligation has been tradi-
tionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, directors
and controlling stockholders."'"
Aside from purely legal considerations, there may be
practical reasons for a reluctance to extend the rule beyond
insiders or those persons who receive inside information
directly from them and act upon it. 2 In short, there is
19 See Painter, Inside Infornmtion: Growing Pains for the Development
of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361,
1383-84 (1965). See also Comment, The Regulation of Corporate Tender
Offers Under Federal Securities Law: A New Challenge for Rule 10b-5,
33 U. Cm. L. REv. 359, 373 (1966).
20 In Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd
per curiam, 279 F2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960), the district court observed:
"Certainly the more reasonable view would seem to be that the duty to
speak which is implicit in Rule X lob-5 arises in those circumstances where
a fiduciary or quasi fiduciary relation exists. . .. But it cannot be supposed
that the rule imposes a duty to speak in all cases involving the purchase or
sale of securities irrespective of the relations of the parties or the circum-
stances under which the transaction is consummated." See also Mills v.
Sarlem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764 (D.N.J. 1955).
21 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). Professor Cary also
observed, however, that officers, directors and controlling shareholders "do
not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation,"
and added:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first,
the existence of a relationship, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
22 See Where The Texas Gulf Ruling Could Lead, Bus. Week, Aug. 27,
1966, p. 38; Inside The "Insider" Issue, Fortune, July 1965, p. 69; Adams,
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strong argument to the effect that the applicability of the
section and the rule should be confined to cases involving a
fiduciary or special relationship between the panities2 3
Applying the above argument and its principles to cor-
porate take-over bids, suppose that Group X, an inside
group, represents in its offer to purchase that Y, an outside
group, is the bidder. Or suppose that the letter of offer
states that the inside bidding group seeks to acquire control
for the purpose of ousting an incompetent management
when in reality the sole objective of acquisition is to liqui-
date. These are clear cases of special relationship and of
active misrepresentation of material facts which may influ-
ence the shareholder in his decision to sell. Section 10 (b)
and rule 10b-5 are applicable. 4
Suppose, however, that no fiduciary or special relation-
ship exists. The bidding group is truly an outside group,
having a nominal interest at most in the corporation sought
to be acquired. The deal is an arm's-length one in every
respect. Suppose further that there is complete lack of
disclosure, or even active misrepresentation, of material
facts, e.g., the bidding group deliberately conceals its iden-
tity or misrepresents it. Fraud there is. Afore than that:
within the language of rule 10b-5, there is "fraud or 'deceit
... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
But, unless the rule is extended to include "any person,"
it is not applicable. As previously indicated, such a literal
extension is highly improbable.25
Cashing In on an Inside Tip, The New Republic, July 30, 1966, p. 14; Painter,
supra note 19, at 1389-90; Ruder, Pitfalls ins the Developnent of a Federal
Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV.
185, 194 (1964).
23At the state level the same argument is appropriate. Section 101 of
of the Uxssoas SECURITIS AcT is modeled, on rule 10b-5, and it covers
both the purchase and sale of securities. Several non-UNFORm AcT states
have recently adopted fraud provisions similar to rule l0b-5. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANx. §517.301 (Supp. 1965).24 Similar considerations should apply when the bidding group makes
unfair use of inside information obtained from insiders of the corporation
sought to be acquired, for it is submitted that such activity creates a special
relationship between the bidding group and the offeree-shareholder. See note
21 supra; Comment, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under
Federal Securities Law: A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5, 33 U. CH. L.
REv. 359, 374 (1966).
25 See text in connection with notes 19-22 supra.
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Tm NEED FO. ExPRESss LEGISLATION ON TAKE-OvEa BIDs
Proceeding from the dubious assumption that existing
statutes, rules or regulations are applicable, by implication,
to cash tender offers, these statutes, rules and regulations
constitute at best stop-gap methods of dealing with the
problem. The most that can be hoped for is to cure the
injury after it has occurred. But a basic philosophy of the
federal securities laws is that of full and fair disclosure
More particularly, there must be made available to the
investor those facts necessary to make an informed judg-
ment before he makes his investment decision. The plain
fact of the matter is that, -with respect to corporate take-
over bids, express legislation is needed to accomplish this
objective. 6
There is no sound reason for asking an investor to
buy in daylight and sell in darkness. In both situations he
should be entitled to the opportunity of making an evalua-
tion of the offer based upon advance material information.
With respect to take-over bids, a minimal amount of such
26 The point has been made by one commentator that the SEC exercises
regulatory authority over proxy statements pursuant to a grant of power
in section 14 "identical" to that granted in section 10(b), and therefore that
the SEC might regulate in advance the contents of a tender offer. Comment,
The Regulation, of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities Law:
A New Challenge for Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 359, 385 n.108 (1966).
However, this comment apparently overlooks the fact that section 14
expressly makes it unlawful for any person, contrary to Commission rules,
"to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy .. . ." while
such an express prohibition is lacking in section 10(b). The same commenta-
tor makes the point that the Commission might require, by regulation under
the present section 10(b), a registration statement in connection with tender
offers, but concludes that express requirements for registration statements in
the 1933 Act and in other federal securities laws "would appear to negate any
congressional intent that the SEC exercise this power." Id. at 384. Along
these same lines, SEC Chairman Cohen has remarked: "We have several
rules which already apply in this area, and I believe that we have additional
rule-making power, which has not yet been exercised, under the existing
statutes. . .. While it is probable that we can adopt rules regulating take-
over bids without legislation, it may be desirable to make this power entirely
clear." Cohen, Address to the American Society of Corporate Secretaries,
Inc., June 28, 1966. Presumably, Chairman Cohen also had in mind the
following rules under the 1934 Act, especially with respect to tender offers
by a company for its own securities: 10b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-2 (1964)
(solicitation of purchases on an exchange); lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6
(1964) (prohibition against trading by persons interested in a distribution);
lOb-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1964) (stabilization).
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information should include the identity, background and
security holdings of the bidding group and what that group
plans to do with the acquired company. The primary appeal
to bidders of the cash tender offer as a means of acquisition
lies in its secrecy. But adequate disclosure legislation
would focus the spotlight of publicity upon these offers and
exert a needed and wholesome influence upon the standards
of business conduct. However, granting that such legisla-
tion is necessary for investor protection, a problem of
economic concern remains: the extent of control of cash
tender offers. After all, the bidders are not offering any
commodity except cash. The objective of legislation in this
important area should be a balancing of interests of bidders
and management to the effect that investor protection will
not suffer either from unduly hamstringing bidders or ex-
cessively shielding entrenched management.
THE PiROPOSED LEGISLATION
Bills regulating cash tender offers were introduced in
the 89th Congress and referred to committees, but this
legislation was not voted upon by either the Senate or the
House of Representatives before adjournment of the 89th
Congress.2
As introduced, the bills are identical and if enacted,
would become amendments to Section 10 (b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934-.
The proposed legislation requires the disclosure of cer-
tain information by persons who make cash tender offers
27 S. 2731, H.R. 14417, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The Senate bill was
referred to the Subcommittee on Securities of the Banking and Currency
Committee, and the House bill was referred to the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce; neither committee has prepared a report on the
proposed legislation as of this date, and neither committee voted on the
legislation before the end of the 89th Congress. Senator Harrison A.
Williams, of New Jersey, who introduced the bill in the Senate, has indicated
that he will probably reintroduce it in the 90th Congress; Representative
Harley 0. Staggers, of West Virginia, who introduced the bill in the House
of Representatives, has indicated that he will introduce it again in the 90th
Congress if he should be requested to do so by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
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for certain securities. 8 Under the bills, the persons re-
quired to make this disclosure are those offerors holding,
or intending to purchase, beneficial ownership"9 of more
than five per cent of any class30 of equity security3 regis-
tered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.32 Those securities which are registered pursuant
to section 12 and to which the disclosure requirements of
the proposed legislation would be applicable are securities
which are listed and registered on national securities ex-
changes and over-the-counter securities of corporations (1)
doing business in interstate commerce or whose securities
are traded by use of the mails, (2) having total assets in
excess of $1,000,000 and (3) having a class of equity securi-
ties held of record by 500 or more persons.3
28 The disclosure requirements of the bills are applicable only to cash
tender offers made by use of the mails or any means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.
29 Although no definition of beneficial ownership is provided in the pro-
posed legislation, presumably the same principles would apply in determining
beneficial ownership in the proposed legislation as have been applied in
determining beneficial ownership for reporting purposes under Section 16(a)
of the Exchange Act, in registration statements, in annual reports, in proxy
statements and in applications for registration as broker-dealers or invest-
ment advisers. For a discussion of the meaning of "beneficial ownership,"
see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 7824, Feb. 14, 1966; 7793,
Jan. 19, 1966.
30 The term "class" has been defined to mean securities which are sub-
stantially similar in character and the holders of which partake of substan-
tially similar rights. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g) (5), 48 Stat.
S92, as amended, 78 Stat. 565 (1964), 15 U.S.C. §781(g)(5) (1964).
31The term "equity security" has been defined to include "any stock or
similar security; or any security convertible, with or without consideration,
into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right. . . ." Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (11), 48 Stat 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(11)
(1964).
32 In determining whether a person is the beneficial owner of more than
five per cent of a class of any security, a class is defined to consist of shares
of such class which are outstanding, not including shares of such class which
are held for the account of the issuer. The choice of five per cent, of
course, is an arbitrary one, and this figure may or may not amount to control.
Rule 405 of the 1933 Act defines "control" in terms of "possession, direct
or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities,
by contract, or otherwise." See also Sommer, Who's "it Control"f--S.E.C.,
21 Bus. LAw. 559 (1966).
33 For a discussion of the criteria necessitating registration of securities
under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, see Sowards and Mofsky, Federal
Proxy Regulation: Recent Extension of Controls, 41 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
165, 171-79 (1966).
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Offerors who come within the purview of the bills may
not make cash tender offers until twenty days after such
offerors have sent a prescribed notice to the issuer"4 of the
securities involved and filed a statement with the Com-
mission. These notices and statements must disclose the
following information:
(1) the names and backgrounds of the persons making the
tender offer and if the tender offer is being made by an
agent for a principal, the names and backgrounds of all
principals;(2) the source of the funds to be used in the purchases, and if
the funds are borrowed, the names of the lenders and a
description of the loan transaction;
(3) the offerors' reasons for making the tender offer and if the
reason is to acquire control of the business or representa-
tion on the board of directors, the plans of the offerors
for the future business of the corporation being acquired;
(4) the number of shares of the security being acquired which
are already beneficially owned by the offeror and his asso-
ciates, and the dates of purchase of such securities, prices
paid, short sales effected, names of broker-dealers through
whom such purchases or short sales were effected and
prices of each purchase or short sale;
(5) information as to any contracts or arrangements with
respect to the securities already owned or to be acquired,
such as loan or option arrangements, transfer arrange-
ments, joint ventures, puts and calls, guarantees against
loss or guarantees of profit, division of losses or profits, or
giving or withholding of proxies; and
(6) any additional information which may be prescribed by
the Commission in rules or regulations for the protection
of investors.3 5
The purpose of requiring disclosure of the above in-
formation is to provide the security holder with material
facts necessary for him to reach an informed decision as
to whether or not he should tender his shares. SEC Chair-
man Cohen has pointed out that the argument has been
34 The notice must be sent, by registered mail, to the principal executive
office of the issuer of the securities.35 Any material changes which occur in the facts which are set forth in
the notice and statement must be promptly transmitted to the issuer and
filed with the Commission.
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advanced by some persons that the "basic factor which
influences shareholders to accept a tender offer is the
adequacy of the price."" However, it is questionable whether
the average investor can determine the adequacy of price
without knowing the identity of the offeror and the offeror's
plans for the future business conduct of the corporation.
For example, an offeror may have plans to liquidate a cor-
poration for a per share amount which is greater than the
price offered for the shares. If so, shareholders who are
apprised of the liquidation plans may decide to wait for
their per share liquidation value rather than tender their
shares for the offered price. At least such informed share-
holders would have the opportunity to make knowledgable
decisions. Furthermore, as Chairman Cohen suggests, it
may be unimportant whether or not the liquidation value
of the corporation is generally known, because the success
of a liquidation may depend on the ability and dependability
of the persons undertaking the liquidation. Therefore, in-
vestors may base their decisions on whether or not to tender
their shares on the identity of the persons seeking control
of the corporation, as well as on the plans for liquidation."
The philosophy of full disclosure, that underlies the
proposed legislation and grants an opportunity to investors
to make informed decisions in determining whether to tender
their shares, is not new to the federal securities laws.
As previously stated, the basic principle of the Securities
Act of 1933 is its requirement of furnishing to prospective
purchasers fair and complete information,"3 and the phil-
osophy underlying Section 14 of the Exchange Act and
the Commission's proxy rules is the full and fair disclosure
of material facts to permit knowledgeable and intelligent
votes by security holders in corporate affairs."
In many respects, the proposed legislation is similar
to existing proxy legislation and the Commission's proxy
36 Cohen, supra note 4.
7 Ibid.
38 See S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933); H.R. Rep. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933).
so See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F2d 511, 518 (W Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
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rules. Both the proxy rules and the proposed take-over
legislation contemplate advance filing of material informa-
tion with the Commission. 0 Moreover, much of the in-
formation required in the proxy statement is similar to
the information that would be required in the tender offer
statement." The Commission's rules regulating the con-
tents of proxy statements necessitate more detailed informa-
tion than is required by the tender offer bills."2 However,
the bills authorize the Commission to promulgate rules
requiring information necessary for investor protection,
and, if the legislation is enacted, the 'Commission un-
doubtedly will adopt and refine appropriate rules.
One significant difference between federal proxy regu-
lation and the proposed tender offer legislation is the
absence of Commission regulation of recommendations, by
management or others, to accept or reject tender offers.43
The proxy rules require persons soliciting proxies, whether
management, insurgents or others, to file the required
information statements with the Commission prior to the
solicitation of proxies.44  However, under the proposed
tender offer legislation, only those persons inviting tenders
would be required to file the necessary information with
the Commission before inviting tenders. Accordingly, man-
agement or other persons who opposed a take-over bid would
not be subject to the full disclosure provisions of this
legislation. It is the strong recommendation of the writers
that the proposed legislation be modified, when reintroduced,
to include Commission regulation of recommendations on
acceptance and rejection of tender offers. Such a change
would subject all parties in a take-over bid contest to the
same standards of full disclosure.
Generally speaking, proxy materials are processed by
the Commission through an examination and letter of
comment technique similar to that used in processing regis-
40 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7566, April 8, 1965.
41 For a list of those items of information which must be included in a
proxy statement, see SEC Schedule 14A, Regulation 14A. See also Sowards
and Mofsky, supra note 33, at 195-210.
42 Ibid.
43 See Cohen, supra note 4.
44 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7566, April 8, 1965.
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tration, statements under the Securities Act of 1933.45 Pre-
sumably, this type of procedure would be adopted in de-
termining the adequacy of statements filed prior to a tender
offer. The Commission stop order procedure," applicable
under the Securities Act of 1933, is not authorized with
respect to the regulation of proxy solicitation and the
proposed regulation of tender offers. It is suggested that
the Exchange Act be amended to grant the 'Commission stop
order authority with respect to tender offers as well as
proxy solicitation when the material filed in connection
with such solicitations or tender offers does not conform
to the Commission's specifications. The stop order technique
would afford a timely procedure for preventing distribution
of false or misleading information.
Another marked difference between the proxy rules and
the take-over bid legislation is the manner in which share-
holders are informed of the facts which must be disclosed.
A.1 persons from whom proxies are solicited must be fur-
nished with the prescribed proxy statement either prior
to or at the same time as the solicitation ;4' prescribed
annual reports must be distributed to security holders,
either before delivery of the proxy statement or with the
proxy statement, if the solicitation relates to an annual
meeting at which directors are to be elected." Further-
more, as a result of the 1964 amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, companies which are subject to the
Commission's proxy rules, but whose management does not
solicit proxies, must distribute information statements to
all securities holders. These statements must contain in-
formation which is similar to that information required
in the proxy statement. 9 However, the proposed legislation
regulating take-over bids does not require delivery of in-
formation concerning such bids to shareholders. Although
the information in statements filed under the proposed
4s Sowards and Mofsky, supra note 33, at 211.
46The stop order is an administrative remedy of the Commission used
to suspend the effectiveness of the registration statement. Securities Act of
1933, §8(d), 48 Stat. 79 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77h(d) (1958).
4' See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7775, Dec. 22, 1965.
48 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7508, Jan. 15, 1965.
49 See SEC Schedule 14C, Regulation 14C.
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legislation would be available to the public, availability
does not insure the actual presence of such information in
the shareholder's hands at the time the decision is made
as to whether the shares should be tendered. The Com-
mission has recommended that "all written tender offers
and advertisements concerning them contain such informa-
tion as the Commission may determine is necessary for the
protection of investors."5  It is submitted by the writers
that this recommendation should be included in the bills
when they are reintroduced.
The bills, in their present form, require that offerors
disclose -their intention to make a take-over bid twenty
days prior to the tender offer. If a management were
opposed to the take-over bid, such a management would
have 'twenty days within which to move against the tender
offer even though the offeror could not invite tenders during
this period. To equalize this situation, the Commission
has recommended that
the offering material be filed with the Commission on a confidential
basis five days in advance, and additional offering material at least
two days before its use. This would allow [the Commission] an
opportunity to examine material to assure compliance with the law,
but would not give an opposed management a period in which to
mobilize its resources and take action against the offer, at a time
when the offeror could not solicit tenders or otherwise make his
case.
51
This advantage which management is afforded under
the proposed legislation should be offset by inclusion of
the Commission's recommendation in the bills when they
are reintroduced, or the bills should be modified to deny
management any public utterances with respect to the
tender offer during the twenty-day waiting period. Such
a placing of management on an equal footing with offerors
would be consistent with the proxy rules which require
management to set forth in its proxy statements certain
50 Cohen, .supra note 4. See also Memorandum of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives on H.R. 14417, 89th Congress 17 [hereinafter cited
as Memorandum of SEC].
51 Ibid.
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proposals submitted by security holders within a reasonable
time before management's solicitation.2
Under the bills, offerors are not required to accept all
shares tendered, and if more shares were tendered than
were sought by the offerors, shares tendered early in
the tender period might be taken and shares tendered late
in the tender period might be rejected. This situation
could lead to a rush by investors to tender their shares,
and such a rush might prevent careful consideration by
shareholders of the information which was disclosed. To
obviate this discrimination and pressure, the Commission
has wisely recommended that the proposed legislation should
provide for compulsory acceptance of shares on a pro rata
basis."  Moreover, assuming that an offeror did not receive
the number of shares he sought in a tender offer and
thereafter made a second take-over bid at a higher price per
share, shareholders who tendered their shares pursuant to
the first invitation would receive less than those holders
who tendered their shares pursuant to the second offer.
The obvious unfairness of such a result should be prevented
by revising the bills to require offerors to pay the higher
price to all offerees. However, such a revision should
distinguish between invitations to tender which are part
of the same take-over bid and invitations to tender which
are distinct and separate in time and circumstances. This
distinction is necessary because an offeror may make a
second offer some years after the first invitation and after
many changes in the corporation's business affairs; the time
lapse and business changes may justify a greater tender
price than 'the price extended in the first offer.
The bills expressly exclude the following tender offers
from the disclosure requirements of the new legislation:
(1) offers made by means of a registration statement under
the Securities Act of 1933 or of a proxy statement subject
to Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(however, such offers would be regulated as to disclosure
requirements by virtue of the rules adopted under the
152 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4979, Feb. 6, 1954.
53 Cohen, spra note 4. See also Memorandum of SEC, supra note 50,
at 19.
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1933 Act5" and under Section 14 of the Exchange Act55) ;
(2) acquisitions which are expressly exempted by rules of the
Commission, because such acquisitions would not change
or influence the control of the issuer;
(3) acquisitions which, when added to all acquisitions by the
same person of securities of the same class during the
preceding twelve month period, would not exceed two per
cent of the outstanding securities of that class ;56 and
(4) acquisitions by corporations of their own outstanding equity
securities (treasury shares).
A subsection of the proposed legislation "' grants the
Commission authority to require disclosure of pertinent
information by corporations inviting tenders of their own
equity securities. However, absent Commission rules, such
disclosure is not mandatory, and the bills do not require
the Commission to adopt such rules. It would seem that
all shareholders should be entitled to the same information
and protection regardless of the identity of the offeror.
Shareholders who are invited to tender their shares to the
issuer of such shares may base their investment decision
on management's reason for the acquisition of shares and
the plans of management for the conduct of the corporation's
business. The bills, when reintroduced, should establish
the same standards of disclosure for tender offers made by
issuers and non-issuers.
The inapplicability of disclosure requirements to ac-
quisitions that do not exceed two per cent of the outstanding
securities of a particular class is intended to permit casual
acquisitions that would not change or influence the control
of the issuer. Such acquisitions might be made solely for
investment purposes or such acquisitions might be made
by an issuer of its own stock to provide shares for executive
stock options or stock dividends. However, if gradual pur-
chases of two per cent or less of the outstanding shares
5 4 The basic information which must be disclosed in registration state-
ments under the Securities Act of 1933 is set forth in SEC Form S-1.
55 The information which must be disclosed in proxy statements is set
forth in SEC Schedule 14A, Regulation 14A.
56 As used in the bills, the term "outstanding securities" does not include
securities held by or for the account of the issuer.
57 Subsection (6) of § 10(b), H.R. 14417, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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over an extended period of time amount to a pattern of
seeking control of the issuer, 'then the Commission should
have the authority to require complete disclosure by the
offeror for the protection of the public. Such a pattern
of seeking control may be analogized to a piecemeal sale of
shares by a controlling person under Section 4(1) and
Rule 154 of the 1933 Act." If such a sale of shares has
all the attributes of a "bailout pattern," the staff of the
Commission has stated that it will consider a "distribution"
to be involved." If legislation is enacted the Commission
should adopt rules subjecting gradual acquisitions amount-
ing to bids for control to the disclosure requirements.
The disclosure requirements of the bills are applicable
to tender offers for more than five per cent of any class
of any equity security which is registered pursuant to
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
definitions of "class" and "equity security" are broad,10
and the definition of "equity security" would include bonds
convertible into common and preferred stock, whether voting
or non-voting. 1 Because of the broad language of the bills,
it would appear that their disclosure requirements would be
applicable to tender offers for more than five per cent of
a class of non-voting preferred stock or certain convertible
bonds. Regulatory control over such acquisitions would
seem to be unnecessary, because, in most instances, such
acquisitions would probably not change or influence the
control of the issuer.
The disclosure requirements of the proposed take-over
legislation relate to acquisitions of securities registered
pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act. The vast
majority of over-the-counter securities are not registered
pursuant to section 12,62 and thus these disclosure require-
58 For a discussion of rule 154, see SoWARDs, THE FEDERAL SEcUxRrIES ACT
§4.D4(3) (1965).
59Ibid. See also SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 4669, June 4, 1964;
4818, Jan. 21, 1966.
60 See notes 30 and 31 supra.
621 Ibid.
62 As of June 30, 1965, 1,506 over-the-counter issuers out of an estimated
40,000 in the United States had registered pursuant to the requirements of
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. SEC, 31st ANNUAL
REmoRT 2 (1965) ; LamER, THE STOCK MARKET 5 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
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ments would apply to relatively few over-the-counter issuers.
Although the Special Study of Securities Markets recom-
mended that registration, reporting and proxy regulation
be extended to over-the-counter issuers with 300 or more
shareholders and $1,000,000 in total assets, 63 the 1964
amendments to the Exchange Act extended these provisions
to over-the-counter issuers with $1,000,000 in total assets
and 500 or more shareholders. In previous congressional
efforts to broaden coverage under the Exchange Act, at-
tempts were made to regulate over-the-counter issuers with
50,64 300 65 and 500 66 or more shareholders. It is sub-
mitted that the standard established by the 1964 amend-
ments (500 or more shareholders) is inadequate in view
of the large number of publicly held issuers which are
not subject to the registration, reporting and proxy regu-
lations and which would not be subject to the proposed
take-over bid legislation. For adequate public protection
it is submitted that the recommendations of the Special
Study (300) be adopted.
A subsection of the proposed legislation makes the
disclosure provisions applicable to cash tender offers "which,
if consummated, would result [in the offeror] owning
beneficially more than 5 per centum" of any class of certain
securities. The wording of the bills makes it clear that
the legislation would apply to offerors who owned less
than five per cent of a class of securities and then, as a
result of the consummated tender offer, beneficially owned
more than five per cent of that class of securities. But,
assuming that the offeror owned ten per cent of a class of
securities subject to the disclosure provisions before a
tender offer and then acquired ten per cent more, the
wording of the proposed legislation is unclear as to whether
or not this situation would come within its scope. This
lack of clarity exists because, in the latter case, the
consummated tender offer did not, in itself, result in the
63 SEC REPORT OF SPECuL STUY OF SEcuRmS MARxETS, H.R. Doc.
No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, 151 (1963).
"4H.R. 7955, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
65 S. 2408, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949).
66 S. 1860, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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offeror's owning more than five per cent of a class of equity
securities; the offeror owned more than five per cent of a
class of equity securities before the tender offer was con-
summated. This ambiguity should be eliminated upon
revision of the bills.
The proposed legislation provides at the outset that
"it shall be unlawful for any person" to make certain tender
offers for certain securities unless he complies with dis-
closure requirements previously discussed. The words "it
shall be unlawful" appear in Section 14 of -the Exchange
Act (the proxy legislation) and in rule 10b-5, and implied
private rights of action have been held to exist under
Section 14 of the Exchange Act for violations of that
section 67 and under rule 10b-5 for violations of that rule.'
Presumably, then, a private action could be maintained
for violations of the proposed take-over bid legislation,
although no provision of the Exchange Act or of the bills
expressly grants anyone other than the Commission author-
ity to institute proceedings.
Inasmuch as enactment of the take-over bid legislation
would constitute an amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the remedies or courses of action expressly
provided for violations of that Act would apply to violations
of the proposed legislation. Accordingly, in its enforce-
ment of the proposed take-over bid legislation and the
rules adopted thereunder, the 'Commission could -(1)
conduct investigations;69 (2) publish information relating
to violations ;70 (3) bring disciplinary proceedings when
the wrongdoer is a broker, dealer or exchange member;71
(4) delist securities which are involved in violations of
,6 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
63 See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v.
Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960). See also Painter, Inside lifor-
ination: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law
under Rule l0b-5, 65 COLum. L. Rlv. 1361 (1965).
69 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 48 Stat. 899, 15 U.S.C. § 78u
(a) (1964).
70 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 48 Stat. 899, 15 U.S.C. § 78u
(a) (1964).
71 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15, 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 78
Stat. 570-73 (1964), 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (1964).
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the legislation;"2 (5) request the Attorney General of the
United States to prosecute willful offenders;73 (6) seek
injunctive relief in the district courts. 4
TAxE-Ovim BID LEGISLATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES
SEC Chairman Cohen has stated that the Commission
examined the laws and regulations governing take-over
bids in Australia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
England and Ontario before making comments on the pro-
posed United States legislation."5
A bill regulating take-over bids was recently intro-
duced in the Ontario, Canada legislature," but has not yet
been enacted. This bill includes certain provisions which
would obviate some of the problems existing under the
bills introduced in the United States Congress. For
example, the proposed Ontario legislation provides that
shares deposited pursuant to a cash tender offer may not
be "taken up and paid for" by the offeror until seven days
after the making of the offer. During this seven day
period, certificates which have been deposited may be with-
drawn at the option of the depositors. Furthermore,
take-over bids must remain open for a period of fourteen
days after the initial seven day period during which tendered
shares may be withdrawn. Thus, the Ontario bill provides
for a minimum period of 21 days during which shareholders
may carefully consider the take-over bid. The United States
bills do not prescribe a minimum period during which
the take-over bid must remain open, and no provision is
made for the withdrawal of tendered shares.
The proposed Ontario legislation also provides that the
offeror must accept shares on a pro rata basis if the number
72 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19, 48 Stat. 898, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)
(1964).
73 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 48 Stat. 904, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e)
(1958).
74 See note 44 ripra.
75 Cohen, .tpra note. 4.
76 For the background and reasons for the proposed Ontario legislation,
see REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMmITTEE oN SECUmTIES LEGIS-
LATION IN ONTARIO (1966).
77 Id. at 24.
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of shares tendered is greater than the number specified
in the offer." This rejection of the theory of "first come,
first served" helps prevent a rush by shareholders to
accept the -tender.
The proposed legislation also contains provisions to
insure that an offeror who subsequently raises the price
for tendered shares be required to pay the higher price
for shares accepted on the first offer as well as on the
second offer."9 These provisions eliminate many of the
previously discussed inequities which would exist under the
proposed United States legislation.
The purpose of the proposed Ontario legislation is
to provide shareholders with sufficient material facts so
that they may make informed investment decisions." To
implement this goal, the proposed Ontario legislation re-
quires the disclosure of the following information:
(1) the number and designation of any securities of the offeree
company owned by the offeror, offeror's directors and
executive officers and each holder of more than 10% of
any class of equity securities of the offeror company;
(2) the number and designation of any securities of the offeree
company traded by the above named persons for the six
months preceding the date of the offer;
(3) the particulars of an offer conditioned upon acceptance of
a minimum number of shares;
(4) the particulars of the method and time of payment for
shares tendered;
(5) the fact that an offer is made on behalf of an undisclosed
principal;
(6) certain information regarding the trading of the securities
sought to be acquired;
(7) arrangements between the offeror and directors or execu-
tive officers of the offeree company as to compensation
for loss of office or arrangements as to remaining in or
retiring from office;
(8) particulars of any information which indicates any material
change in the financial position of the offeree company
since the date of the last published financial statement.81
78Id. at 25.
79 Id. at 26.
80 Ibid.
sl Id. at Appendix B.
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It should be noted that the above requirements contain
no provision for disclosure of the offeror's reasons for
seeking control of the offeree company. However, the
Ontario bill requires that the offering letter be accompanied
by a prescribed take-over bid circular. This circular must
contain the above-described information. Thus, the proposed
Ontario legislation does require actual distribution of
some information to shareholders. As previously men-
tioned, under the proposed United States legislation, no
information statement need be distributed to shareholders
with the document inviting tenders.
A weakness in the Ontario legislation regarding take-
over bid circulars is the absence of a requirement that such
circulars be reviewed by or filed with the Ontario Securities
Commission.2 Another significant weakness in the Ontario
bill is its failure to require' the disclosure of the identity
of offerors. 3 It is submitted that the identity of the offeror
is sufficiently important to the shareholder in making an
investment decision that such information be required
in all take-over bid circulars.
The proposed Ontario legislation does not require the
offeror to submit a take-over bid to the offeree company
before it is submitted to the shareholders."4 In this respect,
the Ontario bill differs from the proposed United States
legislation and the Licensed Dealer Rules of the United
Kingdom Board of Trade which regulate take-over bids.85
Aside from its meritorious provision for actual dis-
tribution of information to offeree-shareholders, for pro
rata acceptance of shares, and for acceptance of all shares
for the same price, the proposed Ontario legislation fais
to furnish that high degree of investor protection afforded
by the proposed United States legislation. 6
82 Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.4 Id. at 23.
85 Ibid.56 However, the Ontario legislation was designed, as the Kimber Com-
mittee explains, to meet the peculiar financial needs of the Province of
Ontario. See REPoRT OF THE ATroan"y Gm tAi's Commi=rE oN SEcumRTiEs
LEGSLATON IN ONTARIO (1966).
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CONCLUSION
Existing statutes, rules and regulations inadequately
deal with the problem of cash tender offers. This inadequacy
constitutes a serious gap in securities regulation which
should be filled by the enactment of express legislation.
Proposed legislation in the United States and in other
countries constitutes a move forward. But such proposals
fall short of achieving that balancing of interests of bidders
and management necessary for sound investor protection.
Before making a cash tender offer, bidders should be re-
quired to file pertinent material with the Securities and
Exchange Commission to ascertain whether there has been
compliance with full and fair disclosure requirements. In
this respect, however, bidders and management should be
placed on an equal footing; filing should be made on a
confidential basis to prevent advance mobilization by man-
agement. Additionally, management's statements and ma-
terials in opposition to or in support of the cash tender
offer should be subject to the same disclosure standards
as those established for bidders. Even more important,
full and fair disclosure should not be limited to filing in-
formation statements with a regulatory agency. Rather,
it should include actual distribution (upon expiration of
the waiting period) of such statements to shareholders
before their investment decisions are made.
Enactment of adequate legislation in this important
area of securities regulation would implement investor pro-
tection in a manner that should instill confidence in the
investment community.
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